



An Evaluating Perusal of Punjab's Role in the Paradigm of Pakistan Movement

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Abstract

This study attempts to comprehend the role of the Punjab Province in the Pakistan Movement from the annexation of the Punjab 1849 to the partition of India 1947. The Colonial Punjab was the largest province of the subcontinent before the Indian partition. Being situated in the north-west of India, it has been a gateway to the subcontinent for foreign invaders. The Punjab suffered many invasions by the external powers in different times. In fact, the fertile lands of the Punjab always provided lucrative temptation to the assailants. Thus, the geographical position made Punjabis the sturdy and enterprising people. Being frequently exposed to the foreign attacks, the people of the Punjab developed martial traits merely for survival and defense. The British occupied the Punjab in 1849 as a result of which the province underwent numerous changes of far-reaching repercussions. The Punjabis considered the British as their saviors who relieved them from the Sikh rule. Apart from this, the British policy to control the Punjab proved very successful to materialize their vested interests. From the later period of the nineteenth century onwards, the Punjab experienced a rapid and enormous economic growth which came in the wake of development of canal irrigation system under the British rule. This development underscored the significance of the region and the Punjab became one of the major hubs of commercial agriculture in South Asia. As a result, the British Government primarily initiated to introduce a Muslim landed elite class in the province. Having carefully studied the cultural contours and social structures of the province, they exploited its tribal or *biradari* system while dividing it into various parts. Consequently, the nexuses between the British Government and the rural elite from the Unionist Party ruled the Punjab before the partition of India. This research article critically examines the role of the Punjab Province in the Pakistan Movement and explores the different facets of various communities striving for their political struggle against the foreign rule. The Punjab was a Muslim majority province, especially the central Punjab had a predominant Muslim population. The Muslims of the Punjab were less active during the second half of the 19th and the early half of the 20th century. However, the political awareness in the Punjab came a bit later than it had emerged in many other provinces of the subcontinent. The political struggle of the Muslims for their conferred interests started in Punjab province with the creation of the Muslim League in the province in the year 1907. Although, it took three decades after its creation to get support at the grass root level due to the stronghold of the Unionist Party in the political sphere of the Punjab. The provincial elections of 1936-37 resulted in establishing the supremacy of the Unionist Government in the province but later on the general elections of 1945-46 led to the political consciousness for a separate identity under the flag of Muslim League which galvanized the Muslims of the Punjab. Besides this, the eventual fall of the Unionists and the rising popularity of the Muslim League under the charismatic leadership of Muhammad Ali Jinnah concluded the creation of Pakistan. The present study endeavors to unveil that despite internal strife, the resistant groups of the Punjab resiliently suppressed the external powers and subsequently transformed this resistance into the Pakistan Movement. Simultaneously, this paper provides a conceptual analysis of the constitutional and political developments during the colonial period under the British rule in the Punjab.

Keywords: Colonial Punjab, British Rule, Pakistan Movement, Resistant Forces, Unionist Party, Punjab Muslim League

Conceptual Analysis

The name "Punjab" which was given to this province during the Muslim period is derived from two Persian words –viz 'Punj' referring to five and 'Aab' which means water. Therefore, its name is deduced from the geographical verity 'the land of five rivers' (Encyclopedia Britannica, 9th edition). These five rivers; Jehlum, Chenab, Ravi, Beas and Sutlej, have been flowing through its territory since long and bestow upon it incalculable bounties. Earlier, it was presumed that the Punjab was first invaded by the Aryans, and it was here that they composed their Vedic hymns, the great literary memorial of the settlement in the country (Ghai, 1986). The Punjab has an immense significance in the history due to its geo-political and socio-economic arrangements (Ali, 1988); the best pastoral savanna, fertile land, rich culture, landed aristocracy, agricultural wealth, food basket, martial races and the production center of the military recruits, all these facets distinguished it as one of the focal points of Indian Politics. Thus, the Colonial Punjab, was one of the more progressive, developed, wealthy and dominant province than rest of the provinces of Muslim-majority and it had also successful and consistent provincial leaders (Hasan, 1979). At that time, the key of the Indian politics was the Punjab Province, not only the Congress hierarchy, the Muslim leadership, the Sikh, the British Government but also Mr. Jinnah and the Muslim League who were well aware about the importance of the Punjab and considered Punjab as the center of political activities. It was also believed that where there is no 'Punjab', there is no panorama of

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'Pakistan'. Furthermore, Mr. Jinnah in his statements and speeches firmly declared 'Punjab' as the corner-stone of Pakistan (Talbot, 2002). Perhaps, the division of India could have been prevented only by the Punjab Province, and supported the creation of Pakistan. In the words of Ian Talbot, "Pakistan creation depends on the Punjab" (Talbot, 2002). As it is said earlier, the Punjab was mainly inhabited by the Muslims, but this situation was disturbed as its economic importance and agricultural prosperity attracted other communities; the Hindus and the Sikhs migrated in multitudes from its eastern part to the central Punjab. The considerable migration from the other parts of the Punjab that followed upon canal construction and the ensuing extension in agricultural activity has made the canal colonies a phenomenon of major importance in the recent history of the Punjab (Gilmartin, 1988).

Besides this, the consequences of the war of independence in 1857; the British Government confirmed the titles and granted landed estates to many of the tribal's Maliks of Western Punjab who had supported them. Subsequently, many of these landed families began to play central roles in the British administration. Through grants of land and other honors, they sought to bind these classes of rural patrons to their rule (Gilmartin, 1988). Thus, the new rural leaders were strongly tied to the British administration from the very beginning. They owed their loyalty to their British masters under whose tutelage they were enjoying all kinds of privileges. It was difficult for them to displease and annoy their benefactors and be deprived of worldly means of subsistence in the form of landed class and titles. These were among substantial reasons which slowed down any political activity in the Punjab. Apart from these rural leaders, there was yet another venerated class having a very deep influence upon their unlimited followers. They were the '*Sajjada Nashins*' and the '*Pirs*' of various shrines. The British Government could not ignore their religious and social influence on their followers who were in large scale. These shrines were also centers of local political influence and played an essential role in consolidating the official control. The importance and political influence of this class could never be overlooked, particularly after the war of 1857 (Gilmartin, 1988).

Consequently, the British consolidated special relations with the '*Sajjada Nashins*' and '*Pirs*' who then became the recipients of land grants along with other honors. They also served as zaildars, honorary magistrates and members of the district boards and were granted "landed gentry" grants. These steps proved quite fruitful for obtaining their support to legitimize the established British order and to involve their interest in the Punjab. Therefore, when these influential classes from almost every section of the Punjab population were soothed to sleep, one could hardly expect any political activity from them. Between 1860s and the opening of the twentieth century, the British officials demarcated zails in most of the Punjab, drawing to reflect the tribal distribution of the population (Gilmartin, 1988). Moreover, while allocating these zails the British Government inculcated in 1873 to assure itself that the people of one tribe should be taken in one zail as far as possible so that the contradictory elements could be reduced to minimum level (Talbot, 2009). A leading or influential man of the local tribe was appointed as zaildar in every zail who was to be an agent of the government in his circle and assisted it in the administration of the area. He also represented interests of the zail to the government and his appointment as zaildar added to his stature and influence and brought him close to the British Government (Gilmartin, 1988). As a reward of these services, the British Government awarded the zaildars grants of land which were very essential not only to bolster the loyalties of zaildar families to the government but also increased their influence within the zail system. After 1890, the British Government made wide scale use of grants of land to strengthen the position of many of zaildars, and this practice was greatly facilitated by the opening up of large quantities of land in the canal colonies (Talbot, 2009). These interests were further intensified by the creation of Punjab Legislative Council in 1897 which came to be dominated by the landlords of the province. Moreover, The Punjab Alienation of Land Act of 1900 divided the population into agriculturist and non-agriculturist tribes. The non-agriculturist tribes including the main moneylending groups were strictly forbidden to acquire cultivable lands permanently in rural areas. This measure went a long way to protect the common interests of all the major rural groups i.e., the Hindus, the Muslims and the Sikhs (Talbot, 1988).

Political Consciousness in the Punjab Province

Alongside this imperial administrative system, within Punjab, Sardar Partap Singh Alhuwalia formed the first rural inter-communal political association in 1907, and it was called the 'Association of Landed Aristocracy of the Punjab', which was renamed later as the 'Punjab Chiefs' Association' (Shah Nawaz, 1971). It was a loyalist group which served the interests of both the British Government and landed aristocracy. In the meantime, the formation of the Punjab Muslim League in 1907 was a result of these developments as well as the political awareness in the province. Earlier, in Punjab Province, the League's branch was organized by Mian Muhammad Shafi and Sardar Partap Singh Alhuwalia became the General Secretary and Mian Shah Din became its first president (Encyclopedia Britannica, "Ghadr: Sikh Political Organization"). However, in order to win the support of the rural leaders, the British policy proved very successful during the World War-I (1914-18) when they assisted the rulers in raising a huge number of recruits for the Indian army. The landed class not only helped in providing a huge number of recruits to the Indian army, but it also assisted in both the revolutionary Sikh Ghadr Movement (Talbot, 1988) and the Khilafat agitation (Page, 1982). The British Government became

more closer to the landed class following the channel of Montague-Chelmsford Reforms of 1919. These reforms enlarged the franchise and gave control of certain subjects of provincial administration i.e., 'Local Self-Government and Education', to minister responsible to new Legislative Councils. The 1919 Act which one-sided profoundly in support of the rural electorate provided the kind of opportunity which they desired. An extremely significant characteristic of these reforms from Punjab's point of view was to institutionalize the existing political divisions between the urban and the rural class. Only the members of the agricultural tribes under the Land Alienation Act could place as candidates from the rural constituencies.

Fazl-i-Hussain: Punjab and Pakistan Movement

This political consciousness paved the way towards the formation of the Unionist Party in the year 1923. The founders of this party were Mian Fazl-i-Hussain, Chaudhary Chhotu Ram and Chaudhary Lal Chand (Munawar, 1987). Initially, the Unionist Party was in fact a group of big landholders who were not popular in public. The people who had a little bit of political understanding called it 'Cooperative Society of Big Zamindars' (Munawar, 1987). The majority of the members from all the three religious communities i.e., the Sikhs, the Hindus and the Muslims were its leaders and strength. The Party was patronized by the British Government like an adopted child (Gopal, 1977; Husain, 1977). The mainstream and the definite leader of the pro-British Punjab National Unionist Party was Mian Fazl-i-Hussain, from 1923 till his death in 1936; and he proved himself as one of the most powerful provincial leaders of the Punjab. Though, Fazl-i-Hussain was not a scion of the landed gentry, he worked hard for the party in order to save the landed interests of the Punjab from the urban banias (Hindu moneylenders). They not only controlled commerce and trade in Punjab but they also gradually became the possessors of the forfeited land which was promised as loans securities (Darling, 1932). The solemnity of the condition could be assessed from the verity that Malcolm Darling's (1922-23) survey pointed out that 83 per cent of the proprietors of the Punjab were in liability (Gopal, 1977). Another, co-founder of the Unionist Party was Chaudhary Chhotu Ram from Rohtak, who was a dominant Hindu jatt agriculturist, writing a few years later, noticed that in fact, it can be carefully supposed that not less than 90 per cent of the agricultural population of the Punjab was in debt at the current time (Qureshi, 1974). Certainly, there was a apprehension in the masses that if the banias were not checked, the agricultural economy of the Punjab would surely "sink into the lowest depth of poverty without any hope of recovery except through a rebellion or revolution" (Rekhi, 1999). This condition was predominantly significant for the Muslims because they were from agricultural background. Mian Fazl-i-Hussain sought to confront this hazard via the Unionist Party by creating an association with strong agriculturists of the Jats under the leadership of Chhotu Ram, the Hindus of the Punjab, and the Sikh community which was represented by Sunder Singh Majithia (Jalal & Seal, 1981). The main idea behind this union was to bring together and closer all the influential landed interests of the Punjab (Waseem, 1989). In the Provincial elections of 1923, the Unionist Party stood victorious with 45 seats whereas 32 seats were grabbed by the opposition.

The Punjab was under the strong clutches of the Unionist Party almost completely dominated the provincial politics. Consequently, the Unionists not only came to govern the province but also increased its power to the center. It also extended its influence into the Muslim politics at All-India level in the late 1920s through All-India Muslim Conference that was founded by Mian Muhammad Shafi, and Mian Fazl-i-Hussain. The All-India Muslim Conference, under the control of the Unionists, overshadowed the All-India Muslim League in the early 1930s, and rendered the Punjab Muslim League incapable of upsetting the Unionist's position or status in the Punjab politics. Whereas, Muhammad Ali Jinnah was the only renowned Muslim leader who did not attend Muslim Conference in 1929, and was still known for his position that he took for All-India nationalist in politics. On the other hand, Fazl-i-Hussain, the Unionist leader used his status to protect for himself the membership in the Viceroy's Executive Council, where he served for five years, from 1930 to 1935. This membership made him empower to manage and direct the Muslim Conference and to control the selection and conduct of the Muslim delegation at the Round Table Conference in London, the chief purpose was to somehow weaken Mr. Jinnah's position (Ahmad, N.D). In fact, Fazl-i-Hussain was a veteran to assist plan for the Government of India Bill in a way that would further fortify the Unionists in provincial politics. He was mainly interested in securing separate electorates and preserving constitutional majority in the Punjab. With regard to the Punjab, on 5th September 1931, he wrote to Nawab of Chhitari that the Muslims very properly insist on representing population basis and are entitled to it (Husain, 1977).

At the center, with the intention of testing Indian progress, Fazl-i-Hussain did not endorse of the presence of Jinnah in the Round Table Conference. He wrote to the Governor of the Punjab, Malcolm Halley (1872-1969), "I do not like the idea of Jinnah doing all the talking and of there being no one strong-minded enough to make a protest in case Jinnah starts upon expressing his views when those views are not acceptable to Indian Muslims. I want someone who would frankly say that it is not the Indian Muslim view" (Ahmad, 1968). From the UP province, Shafaat Ahmad Khan was selected as a member of Muslim delegation for this sole purpose. The addition of Fazl-i-Hussain's key membership, Shafaat Ahmad Khan at the Second Round Table Conference, in the delegation and the presence of some Muslim leaders associated Gandhi as his advisories on the "Communal

issue". Indeed, it incited Jinnah to comment in following years that the approach of "toadies and flunkies on the one hand and traitors in the Congress camp on the other" compelled him to depart from Indian politics and indeed settle down in London. However, at the moment, Fazl-i-Hussain had his own approach, and through his painstaking exchange of 'Notes and Points' (Metcalf, 2006) delineated through communication with the Muslim members of delegation, mainly Aga Khan, Shafaat Ahmad Khan, and Zafrullah Khan, improvised to make safe the 'Communal Award'. Azim Hussain not only expressed it as 'very much Fazl-i-Hussain's creation' but also continued to assert that, "it put the Muslim mind at rest, and it also concluded the labour of Fazl-i-Hussain for five years in the Government of India" (Husain, 1977). While, Azim Hussain was very right in asserting that the 'Communal Award' was mainly an accomplishment of Fazl-i-Hussain and his men in London, the truth remained that it was beyond an acceptable resolution of the Muslim predicament. Azim Hussain himself confessed that the Muslim claim that residuary powers should be vested in the provinces was not accepted. The reality that it was to be exercised by the Governor General in his prudence was matter of little consolation in the face of mounting demands for self-government at the centre. Azim Hussain also recognized that the demand for 33 per cent quota in the cabinets, central and provincial, was not met. He was definitely not accurate in telling that the "Muslims in the Punjab were given a statutory majority" (Thompson & Garratt, 1962). Obviously, the Muslims were assigned 86 out of 175 seats (Ahmad, 1977).

However, in the Muslim-minority provinces, the Muslims' position did not get better at all. Sir Aga Khan and Shafaat Ahmad Khan struggled their to seek the attention of Fazl-i-Hussain to the fortune of the vulnerable Muslims in the provinces with minorities, but all in vain. Fazl-i-Hussain could only countercharge and scoff at. Understanding and experience the situation is a great thing but it plays blaze with illusions (Ahmad, 1977). Indeed, Fazl-i-Hussain's valid apprehension was not the development of Muslim policy on an all-India basis but to fortify the grip of the Unionists in his own province. It was obvious in his tireless efforts to make the 'Communal Award' disburse its bonus in the Punjab. He used it to go into a communal agreement with the Hindus and the Sikhs in the Punjab. It does not matter that how dangerous the whole idea might have been to the notion of Muslim harmony which was pursued by his Muslim Conference and promoted by his partners in the Muslim-minority provinces. "In fact I do not see how Punjab Muslims", he told Shafaat Ahmad Khan bluntly in his letter of 19th June 1933, "can be deprived of the chance of improving their position (Ahmad, 1969)."

Keeping in view, the increasing popularity of the Unionists in the Punjab, Jinnah reached Lahore to hold negotiations with Fazl-i-Hussain to preparing a strategy for the future scenario of the Indian politics. He tried to convince the latter on the supreme requirement of the Muslims uniting on the League's platform. Therefore, he suggested that Muslim contestants from the province should compete in the elections as Leaguers not as Unionists. Despite his all efforts, Fazl-i-Hussain could not realize the need of uniting the Muslims and categorically rejected Jinnah's proposal. Commenting on this situation Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad writes: "all the cogent reasoning and pleading of Mr. Jinnah fell on deaf ears" (Ikram, 1939). In fact, Fazl-i-Hussain was not ready to give any breach to Jinnah to intervene in the Punjab. While, referring to this conflict of opinion between the two great leaders, S.M. Ikram remarks: "two iron wills were, now, in headlong collision" (Ikram, 1939). During the visit to Lahore, Mr. Jinnah also shared his views with Raja Narendranath, the leader of the Hindu Mahasabha: "Fazli thinks he carries Punjab in his pocket", "Raja Sahib, I am going to smash Fazli" (Batalvi, 1989). Thus, the Unionist Party became a big obstruction in the course of uniting the Muslims at League's platform. While, Ashiq Husain Batalvi criticizing the Unionists, comments: "Whenever there was any sign of political awakening among the people in the Punjab, the leaders of the Unionist Party in collusion with the Governor of the province crushed it. This was a monopoly concern of some big landlords of the province. The greatest harm they did was to split the Muslims into urban and rural classes and stretch the division to such an extent that the two classes looked upon one another like enemies" (Batalvi, 1989). Pointing towards this artificial division in the Muslim ranks, Allama Iqbal during the course of his speech at the annual procession of Anjuman-e-Himayat-e-Islam at Lahore, he said, "It is very unfortunate that the tension between urban and rural is being supported by Fazl-i-Hussain. Initially, he was elected because he represented Muslims not because he had roots from rural land. He deliberately fomented the above mentioned conflict, so he may secure his position. The outcome of these causes and forces was that true leadership became extinct among the Muslims and the political field has gone into the hands of some exceedingly worthless fortune-hunters" (Malik, 1985).

Nevertheless, Malik Barkat Ali, a true leader of the League, rendered great services to reorganize the Punjab Muslim League and gave a big helping hand in this respect. But the League still suffered due to factionalism in its own ranks and files, the lack of proper leadership as well as domination of the Unionist Party over the Punjab politics. After its reorganization, Allama Iqbal was chosen as the President of the Muslim League Punjab along with Khalifa Shuja-ud-Din and Malik Barkat Ali as Vice Presidents and Ghulam Rasul Khan as Secretary. A pamphlet was published with the title of "An Appeal to the Muslims of Punjab" under the supervision of these leaders in 1936. The pamphlet esteemed and eulogized the responsibility and services of Mr. Jinnah towards the settlement of Mosque Shaheed Ganj issue in 1935-36. While, the Unionists were subjected to criticism and were condemned for fortifying the gap between the urban and rural. Under the signatures of Raja Ghazanfar Ali, Allama Iqbal, Malik Barkat Ali, Shuja-ud-Din and other well-known leaders appealed to the Muslim public of

the Punjab province to vote and support the Muslim League candidates in the forthcoming elections (Talbot, 1988). Thus, the Shaheed Gang issue created a swear disturbance amongst the Muslims in the Punjab province. However, the League's position was quite frail at the time of the elections. Its 'Propaganda Committee' had to face multiple difficulties to generate favor in the countryside. For the rural population, there was a little enticement in its policies. The Unionist party did well in achieving an all-out favor of the Punjab's pirs who had blind following of their disciples. Indeed, a great number of pirs served a crucial role as candidates and propagandists for the Unionist Party (Talbot, 1988). Besides, fourteen of the influential pirs of the Punjab and its adjacent regions ordered an election plea on the behalf of the Unionist Party (Ahmad, 1977).

Nevertheless, if the Punjab's Sikhs and Hindus "persist in not playing the game", Fazl-i-Hussain elaborated in the privacy of his diary, "Punjab Muslims should not insist, but let the reforms be the establishment of autocracy and make sure that this happens all over India — long-live John Bull! (Gilmartin, 1988)." The incongruity of the situation was that Fazl-i-Hussain had attained a reputé as a powerful supporter of Muslim wellbeing and thus was broadly recognized among the Hindus and the Sikhs as a communalist, but he did not have the visualization, vision and dedication to lead Muslim India towards a national goal (Page, 1982). In fact, his "Punjab Formula", was a sketch to protect provincial benefits of the Punjab as per new constitution and to spare the center to the British domain. The effect of this was that things were made easier for Fazl-i-Hussain by the unwillingness of the princes of the princely states to join the new Indian centre, the all-India Federation. Thus, Fazl-i-Hussain could set up provincial regulation "unfettered by responsible central control" (Talbot, 1988). However, as bad fortune would have it, Fazl-i-Hussain demise on 9th July 1936, after a cruel assault of bronchitis, long before his objective of powerful provincial rule could be understood. He was first, and last, a most influential and dominant provincial leader in all fonts. But since his demise in the midst of 1930s when the provincial independence arranged to the provinces under the Act of 1935 was just beginning to give details of its significance, his case will be completed with a debate of the function served by his descendant, Sikandar Hayat Khan. The Government of India Act 1935, in fact, offered a new motivation to political activity and set into motion process of parliamentary democracy in the subcontinent. The British had assured that the constitutional reforms of the Government of India Act 1935, did not deteriorate the position of their rural partners. Only a quarter of the new electorate of 2.5 million voters comprised the members of the non-agriculturist tribes (Gilmartin, 1988; Talbot, 2002). The landowners who were paying at least Rs. 5.00 as land revenue were allocated the right to vote. The tenants with six and twelve were also empowered. In the words of David Gilmartin: "Though, the politics of the Punjab reflected tensions and contradictions within the colonial order, the integrative ideology of imperial rule helped to center-provincial politics on the agricultural tribes and the Unionist Party" (Talbot, 1988). During the new era of provincial autonomy, it was essential for the League somehow to shake the established position of the Unionist Party. Indeed, it was an uphill task, therefore, the Punjab Muslim League was positioned in a tremendously hard position in 1937, in order to make her effective presence in the upcoming elections, handled successfully in the Punjab.

Provincial Elections of 1936-37

When the forthcoming Provincial Elections were imminent, the general feelings among the Muslims were that the different Muslim groups should be united under the flag of All-India Muslim League which was their leading most political platform and organization. However, Mr. Jinnah, after vigilantly observing the overall situation, determined that the Muslims would not be able to take any gain even of the inadequate safeguards provided for them in the constitution, unless they get united and stood united. As the elections were going to be organized on the law of separate electorate, it was very important that the Muslim representatives returned from the platform of a Muslim organization and worked under the party discipline. Thus, Mr. Jinnah was very keen to unite the various Muslim groups on a single platform and tried to reorganize them. The 24th session of All-India Muslim League was held in April 1936 at Bombay, where it was determined to partake in the forthcoming elections and to comprise a 'Central Parliamentary Board' with its branches in other provinces and Mr. Jinnah was endorsed by the League to comprise this Board. Amongst the prominent Muslims nominated to this Board from the Punjab were Allama Muhammad Iqbal, Raja Ghazanfar Ali, Mian Abdul Aziz, Abdul Qadir Qasuri, Afzal Haq and Sheikh Hussain-ud-Din. Mr. Jinnah made persistent hard work to get assistance of the principal Muslim leaders in the Punjab which was the most important province of India.

In the Provincial Elections, the League had to cut a sorry figure as it won only two Muslim seats in the Punjab Legislative Assembly, one of Malik Barkat Ali and the second of Raja Ghazanfar Ali. The Unionists achieved 99 out of 175 seats, therefore, the Unionist Party emerged as a ruling party in the Punjab Province. Although, the position of the Unionists was very strong in the province yet they made use of every means for victory (Ahmad, 1969). Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad writes: "The Unionists employed every tactic of intimidation, graft, corruption, official interference and naturally won the elections but it proved to be a pyrrhic victory as the later events justified it" (Ikram, 1990). Raja Ghazanfar Ali, after being elected, abandoned the League and attached to the Unionist Party which mounted him to the position as a Parliamentary Secretary. A veteran lawyer and a audacious leader with fervor and conviction, Malik Barkat Ali, kept the flag of the League skyward and to a

higher place all by himself in the Punjab Assembly for a number of years. Although, the League suffered humiliation and failed, but it struck roots in the Punjab soil and its message began to appeal and touch the hearts of the Muslim masses in the province. Dedicated and earnest efforts of the leaders like Allama Iqbal, Malik Barkat Ali, Khalifa Shuja-ud-Din, Ghulam Rasul Khan, Malik Zaman Mehdi and Pir Taj-ud-Din generated public support and united the forces, which in a few years toppled the Unionist Party to liberate Punjab from its political domination. According to S. M. Ikram: "Ten years later new forces were operating under the leadership of the Quaid-i-Azam smashed the Unionist Party into smithereens" (Batalvi, 1989).

During this crucial time, Allama Iqbal played a dynamic role in organizing the scattered Muslims into a titanic force by inspiring their hearts with the spirit of Islam. He outstayed in permanent connection with Jinnah, conveying and conversing him his views and assured him his unwavering assistance and support. Ashiq Hussain Batalvi cited; in one of his letters of Allama Iqbal wrote to Jinnah: "I know you are a busy man, but I do hope you don't mind my writing to you so often, as you are the only Muslim in India today to whom the community has a right to look up for safe guidance through the storm which is coining to North-West India and perhaps the whole of India" (Ahmad, 1977). Thus, the Punjab gave an all-out support to Jinnah in his mission which later on culminated in the form of 'Pakistan'. Whereas, it is quite complicated to propose what Fazl-i-Hussain would have done, "if he had lived to witness the operation of the provincial autonomy" Sikandar Hayat Khan, his successor in the Unionist Party and the provincial government had very almost nothing to achieve from provincial myopia of the early years (Azad, 1959). Sikandar had to compete with new ground realities, especially the dominance of the Congress after the 1937 elections. It was perfunctory, in fact having a hostile conduct with the Muslims in the Hindu-majority provinces. Its winning position and ruled in the province not only disturbed the Muslims all over India but also considerably upset the Unionists. A member of the Congress Parliamentary Board, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad (created for the purpose of supervising the work of Congress members in various provincial legislatures of India), much to their vexation, had initiated an active movement to ameliorate and popularize the Congress in the Punjab (and other Muslim-majority provinces) (Malik, 1985). In his stronghold position, the Unionists were truly under hazard because for the first time and they want to join the hands with the League. The result was that a nervous and frightened Sikandar Hayat Khan (in addition to the provincial leaders of other Muslim-majority provinces i.e., Saadullah Khan, Fazlul Haq, and Chief Ministers of Bengal and Assam respectively) had no option but to join Muslim League at its renowned session at Lucknow in October 1937. The League aimed to strengthen and defend itself from Congress.

Sikandar-Jinnah Pact of 1937

The Unionist Party was still a dominant force in the Punjab which made Muslim League's struggle difficult if not impossible. In the meantime, in October 1937, Sikandar (the Punjab's Chief Minister) and Jinnah signed a pact at the Lucknow session of the All-India Muslim League. This 'Pact' is known in the Punjab's history as 'Sikandar-Jinnah Pact'. It recognized the superiority and domination of the All-India Muslim League in the province, and it was predetermined and fixed that in any imminent election or by-election Muslim League and Muslim Unionists would take a united stand. The Premier of the Punjab, Sikandar Hayat Khan, vowed that just after reaching Lahore, he would invite Muslim Unionists to join the League who had not joined it before. The agreement did not contain the complete merger of the Unionist Party into the League though it provided a structure and a framework tier close up cooperation between these two political parties, while at the same time they were allowed to retain their separate identities. This agreement, indeed, improved the status and position of the League, and empowered its place not only in Punjab but at All-India level (Talbot, 2009).

Although, this agreement got a diverse reaction from different political leaders, it proved to be of far-reaching political consequence in favor of the League. Ashiq Husain Batalvi has criticized Sikandar Hayat Khan for approving the pact with the sole objective of bolting up and grab the Punjab Muslim League (Ispahani, 1976). M.A.H. Ispahani argues that Sikandar agreed to the pact just to fortify his ministry against the threat gave by the Congress due to its Mass Contact Movement which was started on in the Punjab in April 1937 (Khaliq-ul-Zaman, 1993). On the other hand, Chaudhry Khaliq-uz-zaman endorse, and appreciated the pact by saying that: "No one can deny that without this action on the part of Sikandar the Muslim League fight would have been confined to minority provinces alone and sooner or later they would have had to go under. Sikandar Hayat saved the Muslims of India by coming to the League session in Lucknow and by infusing new spirit into the organization" (Khaliq-ul-Zaman, 1993). Further, he even goes to the extent of saying that, "his association with the Muslim League at this crucial hour in the fate of the Muslims of India is an event in history and must live forever even to remind us of his greatness". The immediate impact of the Sikandar-Jinnah Pact on All-India Muslim League was that it revitalized her in All-India politics. Sikandar-Jinnah Pact led to a new situation and opens a new debates and dimensions in the Punjab Politics.

For Sikandar Hayat Khan, it proved to be a much more arduous struggle, as he might have thought at first. Allama Muhammad Iqbal and Malik Barkat Ali particularly, the old Leaguers in the province, observed his activities and regularly conveyed to Jinnah. If truth be told, they were persuaded that he was out to smash and destroy the League within. Therefore, Allama Muhammad Iqbal in his letter of 10th November 1937 wrote to

Jinnah: "After having several talks with Sir Sikandar and his friends, I am now definitely of the opinion that Sir Sikandar wants nothing less than the complete control of the League and Provincial Parliamentary Board, I personally see no harm in giving him the majority he wants but he goes beyond the [Jinnah-Sikandar] Pact when he wants a complete change in the office-holders of the League, especially the Secretary who has done so much for the League. He also wishes that the finances of the League should be controlled by his men. All this to my mind amounts to capturing of the League and then killing it" (Mansergh & Moon eds., 1974). Nevertheless, Jinnah was working very vigilantly on his scheme of re-organizing and restructuring the Muslims under the flag of the League, and he badly desired the assistance of the Punjab, as he called it "the Cornerstone of Pakistan" (Allana, 1977). Therefore, he suggested to show "patience". On 20th November 1937, in a letter to Barkat Ali, he encouraged by saying: "I assure you that if you people have a little patience these small matters of detail will be adjusted fairly and justly and mainly in the interest of the cause for which we stand" (Talbot, 1988). The major cause of nervousness and apprehension among the old Leaguers in the Punjab, as Allama Iqbal's letter of 10th November 1937 pointed it out, belonged and was connected to the so-called Jinnah-Sikandar Pact of 1937. Whereas, its terms and conditions were not fairly known. Despite the fact that, Jinnah chose to be judicious and even did not forced down for its full and fair application whereas, Sikandar's concentration was mostly in his own interest. Nonetheless, in consequence of this rapprochement of the League with the Unionists, the League's organizational and restructuring activities in the Punjab, countryside came to an impasse and deadlock until the World War-II (1939-45) when the Quaid was in a pretty good position to dispense with Unionists support. Though, the way to the Muslim League breakthrough in the Punjab province lay in the new world order shaped by the World War-II (Ispahani, 1976).

Lahore Resolution and the Demand for Pakistan

On the political horizon, radical political changes had been taking place in India for the past few years. All-India Muslim League during this period appeared as the one and the only representative political party of the Muslims of the subcontinent. Under the charismatic leadership of Quaid-i-Azam, the League's political struggle culminated in the demand tier "Pakistan" and division of the subcontinent. The Punjab had this honour to organize and host the 27th Annual Session of All-India Muslim League on March 21-23, 1940 at Minto Park (now Greater Iqbal Park) Lahore. During this session, Lahore Resolution, the epoch-making in the history of the subcontinent was passed and a direct 'Demand for Pakistan' was made. The Lahore Resolution stimulated the spirit of the Muslims and practically mounted the pace of 'struggle for Pakistan'. The result of it was that it stimulated the Punjabi Muslims, particularly those who played a vibrant function in the paradigm of 'Pakistan Movement'. But then, this shift was also inevitable that Sikandar Hayat Khan had now to settle with the demand of League for Pakistan, proposed in the year 1940, asking for a separate homeland in Muslim-majority lands including Punjab. It was in fact a difficult call requiring sturdy and imaginative leadership to take charge of the new situation. But, apparently Sikandar Hayat Khan fell, "He chose 'to sail in two boats'. He frequently spoke in two voices, saying one thing on the League platform and another inside his own province (Punjab)" (Talbot, 1988). With the Viceroy's August 1940 announcement and later with the Cripps Mission's acceptance of the League's demand of separation, the Muslim League's influence, power and its significance had started increasing swiftly in All-India politics. With it the League began to increase pressure on the Unionist party (Talbot, 2002). In order to achieve this objective, the League determined to infiltrate into the rural areas to construct a sturdy structural base there. In this regard, 'The Punjab Muslim Students Federation' rendered commendable services, rest of the province to the creation of the state (Talbot, 2009).

Meanwhile, on March 2, 1941 in Lahore, staunch supporter of the demand for Pakistan, the Punjab Muslim Students Federation organized a "Pakistan Conference" which was exercised by Quaid-i-Azam. During the conference, Pakistan Rural Sub-Committee was established through a resolution in order to convey League's message to the public in the countryside for communicating the masses of the rural areas. The Committee inaugurated its programme during the summer vacation in 1941 (Mirza, 1978). It undertook an extensive tour of districts in order to transmit communication of the League to the masses in rural areas. The Committee also made an intensive tour and visited the Western Punjab and in particular those districts and towns, and where Punjab Muslim League had no branch (Mirza, 1978). On organizing the successful conference by the students, Quaid-i-Azam was so pleased with them, that in his presidential address, he paid heavy tributes to the Punjab Muslim Students Federation by saying, "I have also watched your organization of this Conference and your deliberations and let me most heartily congratulate you for the way in which you have organized the Conference (cheers)" (Mirza, 1978). He said further, "I also wish to convey, not only to the young but also to a large body of Muslims of Lahore and those who have come from different parts, that I really appreciate and feel happy that the Muslims in the Punjab are now conscious and aware of the situation (cheers) and that there is a small band of young men who have tried very hard to organize the Conference of Punjab Muslim Students Federation" (Talbot, 1988). While, referring to these activities of the students, Ian Talbot remarks: "Although, this represented only a tiny drop in the ocean, but it was a useful dress rehearsal for the students' propaganda campaigns in the countryside during 1945-46 elections" (Talbot, 1988).

Sikandar Hayat Khan and Pakistan Scheme

In the episode of September 1941 of 'Defence Council', Jinnah had made this point of Pakistan scheme abundantly clear to Sikandar Hayat Khan. Jinnah not only took the Viceroy to task for including the League Premier of the Punjab Sikandar Hayat Khan, and Bengal and Assam Premiers, (Fazlul Haq and Saadullah Khan respectively) in the council without any intimation or approval but also put Sikandar Hayat in a position to resign. Jinnah ingeniously subjugated the 'sunshine' of official support thereby erasing the earlier tattered Muslim League image in the eyes of the powerbrokers in the Punjab and the other Muslim majority provinces. Resultantly, Sikandar Hayat Khan not only offered his resignation from his seat but also guaranteed Jinnah that: "I am willing to abide by the orders of our President [of the Muslim League], whom I have acknowledged as my Quaid-i-Azam, and follow his instructions whatever he decides, right or wrong". This pledge of fidelity and 'loyalty' had incidentally come after Sikandar Hayat Khan's much exposed and oft-quoted rebellious speech on the 'Pakistan Scheme' in the Punjab Legislative Assembly in March 1941: "We do not ask for freedom, that there may be Muslim Raj here and Hindu Raj elsewhere. If that is what 'Pakistan means' I will have nothing, to do with it. If you want real freedom for the Punjab, that is to say, a Punjab in which every community will have its due share in the economic and administrative fields as partners in a common concern, then 'Punjab will not be Pakistan', but just Punjab, the land of the five rivers."

Nonetheless, Jinnah was forced to appear for an openly manifestation with the details of the pact in the League Council meeting in Delhi on 22 February 1942. He explained in detail that Sikandar Hayat Khan with his supporters in the Punjab Assembly had merged into the League without any qualms and reservations. On his part, he had permitted the League to "continue their alliance which was now called as the Unionist Party or to form any other alliance or coalition with any party with timely decisions." Therefore, he also persisted outside the assembly that the League was free to organize and structure itself in any case it considered fit and there was no compulsion on it (Talbot, 2002). It was difficult for Sikandar Hayat Khan that not only he precariously sought to protect his position as a member of the Muslim League but also his standing as the Premier of the Unionist Government in the Punjab that included the Hindus, the Muslims and also the Sikhs. Furthermore, in 1942, the pact between Sikandar Hayat Khan and Baldev Singh (the Akali Dal leader), which increased Sikh representation in the government departments and backed Sikh "segmental autonomy" which provides a typical precedent of consociationalism at work (Gopal, 1977). Besides this, the Hindu members like Chhotu Ram and others were already not happy with Sikandar's association with the League. Chhotu Ram a Hindu Jat, indeed frankly conveyed Sikandar Hayat Khan that they will not accept the League's demand of 'Pakistan'. If he persisted with the League, they will have to reconsider their association with the Unionists. He claimed that out of 29 districts in the Punjab, Hindus or Sikhs are in majority in 13 districts. The Hindus will also not hesitate to make a similar assertion on the Punjab. Chhotu Ram during a meeting of Hindu leaders of the Punjab convened in Lahore on 3 November 1942 even went on further clarified, and in an emotion-charged speech affirmed: "In the matter of loyalty to Hinduism, I yield to none. If anyone were to devour the Hindus, I would not allow him to devour so before I am devoured first" (Ahmad, 1977).

These serious challenges, concerns, and pressure from the colleagues in the Unionist Government put Sikandar Hayat Khan (the Punjab Premier) in a very uncertain situation. Due to this difficulty, he was not able to serve the agenda of the League with keenness and passion nor could he bear the fragmentation of that powerful alliance which had governed the Punjab since the early 1920s. Nevertheless, Sikandar Hayat Khan had steadily but surely moved away from the kind of provincial approach pursued by his predecessor Sir Fazl-i-Hussain in 1936, "I have asked Ahmad Yar [Daultana, then General Secretary of the Punjab Unionist Party] to convey to Jinnah, to strongly press on him the advisability of keeping his fingers out of the Punjab pie. If he meddles he would only be encouraging fissiparous tendencies already painfully discernable in a section of Punjab Muslims, and might burn his fingers; and in any case we cannot possibly allow 'provincial autonomy' to be tampered with in any sphere and by anybody be he a nominee of the powers who have given us this autonomy or a President of the Muslim League or any other association or body" (Malik, 1970). When Sikandar Hayat Khan died in 1942 merely at the age of fifty, his mind was overcrowded; so till death he was not only a member of the Muslim League Working Committee but also a self-proclaimed follower of the 'Quaid-i-Azam'. He himself publicly proclaimed a few weeks before his death: "People exaggerate petty differences. Although, at times I may differ from the [sic] Quaid-i-Azam on an issue, yet I shall never fail to carry out his orders" (Gilmartin, 1988). This was not the least bit a small measure of change in the approach and attitude of Sikandar Hayat Khan on 'Pakistan Scheme' from the provincial leadership of the Punjab. Before the death of Sikandar Hayat Khan a center of Muslim League Party apart from the Muslim Unionists had been formed in the Punjab Assembly. The untimely deaths of Sikandar and the leading Hindu Jat figure Chaudhary Chhotu Ram put pressure on the Unionist Party's fragile factional unity (Talbot, 1988). Sir Shah Nawaz Khan of Mamdot, the President of the Punjab Provincial Muslim League, had also died in 1942. He had held this office for the past few years and had endorsed books in favour of 'Pakistan' even before the passage of Lahore Resolution. Although, he was a permanent member of the Unionist party yet he had not taken a firm line with it. His son, Nawab Iftikhar Hussain Khan Mamdot succeeded him as president of the Provincial League. He created a small cluster of

devoted Muslim Leaguers in the Assembly. One more well-known Leaguer, Mian Mumtaz Muhammad Khan Daultana had also been elected to the Punjab Legislature on the seat vacated by the death of Sikandar Hayat Khan. However, after Sikandar, Malik Khizar Hayat Khan was appointed the next Premier of the Punjab Province.

Malik Khizar Hayat Tiwana: Punjab and Pakistan Movement

Though, this change did not noticeably mirror in the behavior of Malik Khizar Hayat Tiwana. But then, Khizar Hayat was not an acknowledged leader among Unionists from Punjab like his predecessors Sikandar Hayat Khan and Fazl-i-Hussain. There were many other scions of the Muslim landlord nobility with highest ranks and statuses to seize power against Khizar Hayat Khan. The main competitors among them were the Hayats of Wah, the Noons of Sargodha and the Daultanas of Multan District. Nevertheless, Sardar Shaukat Hayat Khan was the most famous among-them who was the eldest son of Sikandar Hayat Khan. Mian Mumtaz Daultana, the son of Mian Ahmad Yar Khan Daultana, and Nawab Iftikhar Hussain Khan of Mamdot, the son of Sir Shah Nawaz Khan of Mamdot referred to earlier. Although, these three young-men (musketeers), scions of leading Unionist families, had their personal differences but now they worked jointly and zealously for the League and were fighting against Unionism (Talbot, 2009). After-sometime, Sardar Shaukat Hayat also returned to the Assembly from another constituency. Thus, their entrance in politics heralded the opening of a new era in the political history of the Punjab. They played an active role in taking the message of the 'Pakistan Movement' to the countryside. On the other hand, Khizar Hayat Khan Tiwana (the Premier of Punjab) was more of an intractable admirer of Jinnah and the League (Ahmad, 1976).

In the beginning of 1943, reputation of the Unionist Party started decreasing, whereas the All-India Muslim League was in the leading position. There was a general discontent against the wartime politics of military recruitment for the army and rationing of food grains which also undermined the Unionist Party's graph as well as Khizar's position. In April 1944, Jinnah reached Lahore and had prolonged talks with Malik Khizar Hayat, endeavoring to determine the League-Unionist relationship with regard to Punjab Politics. He persisted and maintained that all members of the League and the Unionists should belong exclusively to the Muslim League and the Punjab Ministry should be known as the 'Muslim League-Unionists Coalition Ministry'. Khizar tried to evade this issue for some time, but these talks broke down as Khizar insisted that the new 'Coalition Ministry' should retain the Unionist Party name. Therefore, Jinnah maintainly repeated his position more vehemently in a public speech on 30th April 1944: "It was clearly laid down in the so-called Pact — if they insist on calling it a Pact — that it was open to the League Party to carry on the present coalition or enter into any other new coalition".⁸⁶ Jinnah was furious, not astonishingly, when Sikandar Hayat Khan's successor, Malik Khizar Hayat Tiwana in the Unionist Government, was under threat and reservations from his non-Muslim coalition partners, struggled to downgrade the League to the status of a junior partner of the Unionist Party. He reprobated the agreement by saying: "How could there be a Pact between a leader and a follower?" (Talbot, 1988). As a result, in May 1944, Khizar was barred from the League, and was openly criticized as 'traitor' (Talbot, 2002). To add to his woes, his Unionist Government had become quite out of favor "because of overzealous army recruitment and the rationing and requisitioning of grain" during the war years (Talbot, 2009). Resultantly, in 1944, Sardar Shaukat Hayat Khan was dismissed from the cabinet, and with the final League-Unionist clash two parliamentary secretaries Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan and Sufi Abdul Hamid defected from the Unionist Party and joined the League.

On December 2, 1944, the Muslim League Assembly Party chose, its office-bearers unanimously and Khan Iftikhar Hussain Mamdot was elected as the party leader, while, Mian Allah Yar as chief whip and Rana Nasrullah as his assistant. Mian Nurullah was the choice for secretaryship. However, local factional rivalries became big impediments in the way of its rapid advance; whereas the most important factor of its tardy progress was that the landlords still had their stronghold over the rural population. According to Ian Talbot: "The big zamindars obstructed the League activities whom they saw as disruptive to their lucrative connection with the British" (Talbot, 1988). Moreover, the later part of 1944 saw a substantial decrease in the prices of agricultural produced which until then had kept ahead of consumer goods. The zamindars, under this stress, naturally wanted the Unionist party to do something for amelioration, but it had no remedy. To add to their miseries, the Central Food Department banned the movement of grain out of the Punjab Province.

Moreover, the failure of the Simla Conference in July 1945 went a long way to make the fidelity of the Unionist supporters doubtful (Jalal, 1985). The Conference made this fact clear, beyond and doubt that in potential division of high office would depend on alliance with the Muslim League rather than the British Government. Consequently, after the failure of Simla Conference there was a dramatic and decisive change in the regional politics. By 1945, Khizar's hold over the ninety-six assembly members remaining in the Unionist-camp had become increasingly shaky. With the waning moon of the Unionist Party's popularity so quickly, the rural leaders started reassessing their loyalty to it. Now, they were looking for a big-boss suitable for their interests. Even these men had been reminded by Simla that they would soon have to make association and alliance with All-India Party at the centre (Talbot, 1988). The Punjab Muslim League was rejuvenated when leaders like

Shaukat Hayat, Mumtaz Daultana, Iftikhar Hussain Madmot and Firoz Khan Noon joined it. It also thrived in captivating the support of *sajjada nashins* and *pirs* of various shrines.

The Elections of 1945-46

The *pirs* gave their all-out favor and assistance to the League and they issued fatwas (a non-binding judgment from the religious authority) in its favour (Gilmartin, 1988). They had their *murids* (disciples -followers) in thousands in the Punjab. In Jhelum Pir Fazl Shah favored the League while, in Rawalpindi district his brother Pir of Golra Sharif also endorsed him. The Pirs of Sial Sharif and Jalalpur were also strong supporters of the League. While, the Qureshies and Gilanis of Multan became an enormous power for the League. In Jhang district, Shah Jiwana Bokhari Syed Pirs also help out the League camp (Talbot, 1988). On the other hand, the Unionist attempts to rally support through the religious appeals of Ulama from the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Hind carried much less authority amongst the rural voters (Hayat, 2016). By and large, the religious Ulema class which were the product of the Muslim traditional system and the guardians of conventional learning, values and norms among the Muslims, went on to be in opposition to 'Pakistan' all the way. Including Maulana Rashid Ahmed Gangohi and Maulana Qasim Nanautawi who were the founders of Dar-al-Ulum of Deoband in 1866, opposed the division of India. Similarly, Maulana Hussain Ahmad Madni (the founder of Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Hind in 1919) also rejected the demand for a separate state of 'Pakistan'. The Majlis-i-Ahrar-i-Islam by Afzal Haq and Attaullah Shah Bukhari in 1929 and the Khaksar Party by Inayatullah Khan Mashriqi in 1931 also went against the Indian partition and opposed the creation a new country Pakistan. The Jamat-i-Islami which was founded in 1941 by Syed Abul Ala Maududi showed swear reservation and difference of opinion on 'Pakistan State'. Although, the major bulk of the Ulema, remained anti-British throughout the 'Colonial Rule' but on the other hand, they did not give their overwhelming support to the Muslim League, Jinnah and the 'demand for Pakistan' and even refused to accept the two nation theory. However, they also expressed their denunciation of the demand for a separate state of Pakistan (Talbot, 2002). It also further undermined even the level of confidence of the minority population in the province.

Despite the fact that, the Muslim League consolidated out the Unionists in West Punjab (Jalal, 1985). However, "The most remarkable success, was in the districts of Multan, Jhang, Jhelum and Karnal, where the League did best because of the leading *pir* families having decided to back it" (Talbot, 1988). Whereas the splendid effect of this new development was entry of the *pirs* into the League, Ian Talbot states: "They provided a traditional channel through which the League could reach the illiterate and rural voters" (Talbot, 1988). Thus, the League was in a more and more stronger place to compete the provincial elections of 1945-46. In a very short period of time, the League was able to efface and erase the Unionist Ministry through elections and was able to topple the Khizar government, the cost in terms of increased communal tension rendered it unable to form one itself (Ahmad, 1977). The most decisive election combat was fought in the Punjab Province which was considered the foundation of the construction of Pakistan (Talbot, 1988). A thumping victory of the Muslim League vindicated Quaid-i-Azam's assertion to be the one and the only spokesman of Muslim India. The League emerged as the single largest party in the province after these elections. The Unionists' beat opened the way for the absolute dominance of the League in the province of Punjab.

The Governor met Khizar to organize a Unionist-alliance including Congress and the Akali Sikhs (Azad, 1959). Thus, the Muslim League was dispossessed of the compensation of its success which made its leaders annoyed. It is pertinent to point out here that Abul Kalam Azad (1888-1958) also played a vindictive task in having maneuvered to stay the League out of power (Talbot, 2002). With the silent favor and assistance ship and blessings of the British Governor, a remnant of minority elements started ruling the Muslim-majority province. The League was kept out from the rule, which represented majority of the Muslims. It was tremendously intricate for the ministry brought into existence with menacing objectives to stand the test of time. It so happened that the pressure of public anger swept it out almost within a year. Though, the British-Congress combine succeeded in establishing by force upon the Punjab a ministry which was powered by the Congress and the Sikhs which headed by a puppet Chief Minister (Malik Khizar Hayat), yet it was obnoxious for the Muslim. The police arrived at the office of the Provincial Muslim League in Lahore on January 24, 1947 with the directions to perform a search operation. It was an unjustified and unreasonable step which was denied by Mian Iftikhar-ud-Din who was present in the office. Within short time, the renowned League leaders Iftikhar Hussain Mamdot, Mumtaz Daultana, Firoz Khan Noon and Syed Amir Husain Shah reached there. All of them went against the command and presented themselves for arrest. This happening stirred an immense 'Civil Disobedience Movement' which was very nonviolent and obedient by order in nature. The Punjab Government, a strong association of the Hindu Congress, Akali Sikhs and the Unionists backed by the British could not survive the exceptional well-liked agitations and came down to its knees. However, on February 25, 1947, the civil liberties were resuscitated, prohibition on the Muslim National Guards, public processions and gatherings was inhibited (Moon, 1961). The Punjab-Premier, Malik Khizar Hayat Tiwana, bowed before the rising wave of popular offense and resigned on March 2, 1947. Thus, the Punjabi Muslims dismissed a Hindu-Congress powered by an oppressive government; aggravated her despicable designs and paved the way for 'Pakistan'.

Penderel Moon depicts their anti-Muslim sentiments in the following words: "The Sikh leader Master Tara Singh, raised the slogan 'Pakistan Murdabad', and brandishing a sword shouted, '*Raj karega Khalsa baqi rahay na ko*' (The Sikhs will rule; no else will survive)" (Talbot, 1988).

The Governor, Sir Evans Jenkins (1896-1985), did not follow the provocation he had given to the party leaders of the League. On the other hand, he used the turbulence initiated and stirred by the Hindus and Sikhs as an excuse to defer the constitutional government and impose 'Governor Raj' on the Punjab province. The Punjab remained under Governor Raj for the remaining five months of the British Rule (Ahmad, 1977). Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad, commenting on this act of the British Governor: "This is yet another evidence of the British Government's antipathy towards the Muslim League at that time" (Talbot, 1988). Craig Baxter had explained; the name Unionist was not to appear, instead the new name emerged. But the Punjab had given a lucid and striking decision in favour of "Pakistan". It sounds quite logical when Ian Talbot, in appreciation of the Punjab's dynamic role in the crucial stages of the 'Pakistan Movement', writes: "If the Punjabi Muslims had not supported the Muslim League's separatist demand, 'Pakistan' could have never come into existence" (Talbot, 2002). This popular participation marked the final advance of Muslim League in the foundation stone of Pakistan (Talbot, 2009).

Conclusion

As a final point, the Colonial Punjab was the most important Muslim-majority province in the Pakistan Scheme which played the heroic role as an elder brother in the struggle which culminated in the form of Pakistan. The Punjab province had given a translucent and audacious decision in the favour of the making of Pakistan. It was specifically deficient in comprehending the Muslim regional leadership dilemma, and thus their heedlessness threw the conventional political leaders out of the main stage and brought Quaid-i-Azam in the frontline and he tune the regional politics sagaciously as a charismatic leader of the Muslims of India. The layer of leadership conceded to revolutionize nationalist leaders. However, during the campaign for Pakistan, there were three factors which stood out of the narrative. First, the Muslim League was more or less the Unionist Party re-invented in that it stirred support in the year 1946 over the time-honored 'tribal' loyalty and demand of a local Muslim identity associated with religious sentiments specifically to the Sufi Shrines. Second, there was at the same time a mass upsurge during the struggle of "Pakistan Movement" based on religious idealism. Third, the League emerged late in the prospects of future 'corner-stone of Pakistan'.

However, it was the call of Quaid-i-Azam and the League to search for and attain a feasible way out of the distressful situation confronting the Muslims of the British India, which they effectively did in the perfect shape of 'Pakistan'. In a nutshell, the primary sources clearly indicate that Punjab remained under several political, socio-economic, cultural and religious struggling forces against the British colonial power that pushed the imperial rule towards the partition of India. Undoubtedly, the Punjab had to pay heavy price for independence, unfortunately, it was divided and also exploited on the notion of two nation theory. It caused huge migration, forced dislocation and inhuman violence on both sides of the boundary, which left great shock on the feelings of animosity and antagonism between both states Pakistan and India. Now Pakistan is supposed to be a welfare state but the feudal influence yet never allow it to emerge and the concept of a welfare state in Pakistan would ever remain a far cry. To sum-up, in much of what was to become Pakistan, a tradition of bureaucratic authoritarianism or viceregalism was deeply rooted. Its hallmarks were paternalism, wide discretionary powers and the pre-sonalisation of authority. Political institutions were weakly developed in comparison. Though, in Punjab, the future heartland of Pakistan, a special relationship between the peasantry and the army had been established which, Clive Dewey has forcefully argued holds the key to military dominance in independent Pakistan.

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