Rent Seeking Policy, Institutions and Corruption in Specific Countries of the World
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Abstract
Rent seeking policies generate wealth without increasing the real income of a country. These policies are closely linked with the performance of institutions. In the presences of low performing institutions rent seeking policies and corruption only flourish. This phenomenon is common in developing countries. In order to evaluate the association between rent seeking policy, institution and corruption, Panel data technique is applied in the study. The time span of the study is 2001-2020. Rent seeking policies might lower the performance of institutions and this further increase corruption.
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