Comparative Analysis of Bribery as, Criminal Wrongdoing

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Naheeda Ali

Abstract

There is a consensus that bribery, which is explicitly outlawed in the Magna Carta, should be considered a criminal act. Elucidate the criminalisation of bribery may be unexpectedly for those who see harmful actions as the primary criterion for determining what should be made a criminal offence. The predicament faced by these intellectuals is as follows. Bribing sometimes encompasses innocuous misconduct, but the rationale for criminalising it does not stem from any undue damage inherent in bribing itself. The rationale is on the potential damage that may occur if bribery is not penalised, considering the limited efficiency of civil law in reducing its prevalence. According to some theorists, the basis for criminalising activity based on the concept of "remote harm" is considered a secondary and possibly problematic kind of criminalisation. This paper presents a challenge for these theories in elucidating not only the reasons behind bribery but also the reasons behind other significant offences, such as rape, which are often seen as fundamental instances of criminal misconduct. Indeed, criminal law has the lawful authority to include a broad array of harm-related justifications for including action within its boundaries and central principles. One cause for the activity involving inflicting unnecessary injury is the reality itself.

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How to Cite
[1]
Ali, N. 2024. Comparative Analysis of Bribery as, Criminal Wrongdoing. Journal of Policy Research. 10, 3 (Sep. 2024), 70–76. DOI:https://doi.org/10.61506/02.00319.

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